Abstract Credit default swaps (CDSs) are among the most successful financial innovations of recent years, which is reflected in the rapidly expanding market. CDS trading occurs in the over-the-counter market, which relies heavily on broker intermediation to arrange trades. We provide empirical evidence that liquidity in the voice brokered market varies with the particulars of the CDS contracts and that the differences in market structure is reflected in the costs of liquidity. Moreover, the brokered and direct interdealer trading markets seem to be well integrated; thus the higher liquidity costs in the brokered market may reflect the value of intermediation. Hybrid market structures, which combine voice brokerage with an electronic platform, are discussed as a viable alternative to fully automated trading systems.
seek to post quotes to interdealer brokerage platforms. An interdealer brokerage (IDB) company acts as an intermediary between major dealers to facilitate a trade. By enlisting this kind of voice broking or electronic platforms, dealers can benefit from reduced search costs, standardization, and fair price discovery. Interdealer brokerage companies provide an indispensable trading media for instruments that are in their infancy, such as credit derivatives.
Voice broking through interdealer brokerage is not new. IDBs have traditionally been a voice intermediary in other markets, such as bond and foreign exchange (FX) markets. However, voice broking volume in these markets has shifted to electronic trading over time.
1 Information technology enables timely dissemination of quotes; consequently, traders have moved from one market structure to the other. The change of microstructure has altered many attributes of the trade process, such as speed, transparency, anonymity, and execution costs.
The microstructural aspects of interdealer brokers that operate on special platforms in the credit derivatives market have not yet been analyzed in academic literature. With the increasing segmentation of the trading media, these IDB platforms require special attention. Voice broking or electronic platforms in which innovative instruments like credit default swaps (CDSs) are traded have cornered an important share of the market. There are important issues to address in these new markets. What are the determinants of the dealers' choice of direct OTC, voice brokerage, or electronic brokerage trading? Is the intermediation function of voice brokerage valued? Is the increased transparency attained through electronic brokerage desirable to dealers? In this study, we analyze voice broking and electronic IDB structures in order to reveal the added values they possess. Empirical evidence for the differences between the IDB and the opaque, highly fragmented, nonintermediated OTC phone trading is provided. We show that the liquidity in the voice brokered market varies with the features of CDS contracts. The differences of trading in these two markets are reflected in the costs of liquidity; we therefore suggest that the higher trading costs in the brokered market may represent the value of intermediation. It is important to note that electronic IDB platforms do not fully replicate the services of voice broking; the discrepancy may account for the emergence of hybrid market structures. Voice brokers' ability to uncover hidden liquidity and to offer better prices under asymmetric information can be regarded as some of the most important components in the current hybrid market structures. Although it is clear that the increased transparency afforded by electronic markets will affect CDS prices, it is uncertain whether it will lead to a fairer market and better price discovery.
2 Nevertheless, as the frictions of product standardization in the CDS market have been partially overcome by now, the next foreseeable step is towards automation, which will significantly shape future markets.
Our study correlates to the recent literature on the role of interdealer brokerage, their liquidity, and automation. Early evidence provided by Garbade (1978) showed the effect of interdealer brokerage on the performance of dealer markets. His work revealed that search costs will be reduced by joining an IDB, resulting in lower trading costs. However, the additional services provided by today's brokerage firms are not reflected in his analysis. Even in recent comprehensive studies on trading in OTC markets, such as Duffie et al. (2005) , the brokerage function is not addressed. But because of the additional services offered by brokerage firms, the dealers may be willing to pay the extra spread. IDB trading costs can thus be higher than in the non-intermediated OTC market. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the differences in spreads compensate for the added value through intermediation of more complex trades. However, other reasons such as differences in the competitiveness of the two markets are also possible explanations for the differing transaction costs. In any case, we argue that the differences in spreads of two venues represent trading costs only and not asymmetric information components (Bagehot 1971; Glosten and Milgrom 1985) or inventory holding costs (Ho and Stoll 1983) . Secondly, although there is a vast body of literature on electronic trading and automation in other markets, no study is available for the CDS market. Barclay et al. (2006) is among the few studies that compares voice and electronic brokerage venues for US Treasury bonds, which has implications for CDS market structures. Finally, there are connections to the growing credit risk literature. Duffie (1999) , Longstaff et al. (2005) , Blanco et al. (2005) , and are among the most important references for credit default swap valuation and liquidity.
The remaining sections are organized as follows: Section 2 introduces credit default swaps with the descriptive statistics of a dataset. Section 3 describes the role and hybrid structure of interdealer brokers and discusses the market outlook for electronic platforms. In Section 4, the CDS market's liquidity is analyzed by using datasets from different trading systems. The last section concludes with remarks.
Credit Default Swaps

The Product
Credit derivatives are a special type of derivative instrument whose payoffs depend on the creditworthiness of entities.
3 With a 51 per cent share in a rapidly expanding market, credit default swaps are by far the most frequently traded type of credit derivatives (BBA 2004; p. 21) . A credit default swap is a contract that provides insurance against the risk of default of a specific commercial or sovereign entity. The buyer of the insurance agrees to make periodic payments to the seller in exchange for compensation in case of a predefined default by the specified entity in the contract. Upon contract initialization, counterparties have to agree upon these periodic payments, the CDS premiums, which are a percentage of the contract's notional amount in basis points. If default does not occur, the seller pays nothing. If the specified entity defaults during the lifetime of the CDS, there are two forms of settlement: In a 'physical' settlement, the buyer delivers the eligible bonds of the underlying (these 'deliverable obligations' might cover a set of bonds with the same rank as the underlying bond) of the defaulted entity to the seller, in exchange for the contract notional amount. In a cash settlement, however, the buyer keeps the underlying bonds, but is compensated for the loss. In either case, the buyer's loss is fully covered. The BBA Report 3 Within the last decade, alternative credit derivative products have been developed to satisfy the different needs of counterparties. The basic choices of credit derivatives comprise credit default products, credit spread products, and total return products. Credit default products are commonly used to offset default risk, whereas credit spread products offset the whole credit risk, i.e. the risk of increasing or decreasing spreads. The third type, total return products, transfers both credit and market risk between counterparties. More advanced forms of credit derivatives include credit-linked notes, basket credit derivatives, and asset-backed securities.
shows that 86 per cent of transactions contain a physical settlement clause, whereas the rest are based on cash settlements.
Any instance in which the seller is required to make the full notional payment to the buyer of the CDS is called a 'credit event'. The types of credit events described in the Credit Derivatives Definitions by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) in 1999 (ISDA) in (revised in 2003 are bankruptcy, obligation acceleration, obligation default, failure to pay, repudiation/moratorium, and restructuring. Nevertheless, lack of consensus on the definition of a credit event is still seen as the major drawback of a CDS contract in practice. The BBA Report reveals that of the major problems incurred in the CDS setting, the non-agreement on the nature of a credit event is ranked first. This issue underscores the importance of standardization for further development of the market.
A CDS contract possesses several other attributes. For example, the maturity of the contract describes the coverage of the insurance in terms of years. The most common practice in the industry is to agree on a 5-year contract, whereas liquid entities may range from 1 to 10 years. Another important contractual attribute is the rank of the underlying, which can be either senior or subordinated. Due to the difference in priority of payments to debt holders, subordinated CDSs command a higher insurance fee than senior CDSs. A third aspect is the restructuring clause applicable in the contract. The European and North American clauses differ in that North American contracts limit the set of deliverable bonds in case of default, which again should be reflected in CDS premiums (see Blanco et al. 2005; .
The counterparty risk inherent in CDS trades is reduced by the fact that trades are usually conducted between dealers of major institutions with relatively high credit ratings. As a consequence, the composition of market participants differs from that of the corporate bond market. According to Blanco et al. (2005) , this structural difference is one reason why the CDS market provides timelier price information than the bond market. In addition, two further aspects work towards the lead effect in the price discovery process. 4 First, short-sales constraints in the bond market are not present in the CDS market, as CDS contracts can be set up synthetically at any time. Moreover, the transfer of credit risk can be done in relatively higher volumes in a single contract. Second, the CDS market blends participants from different pools. Both aspects make the CDS market the easiest place to trade credit risk. In a CDS contract, the financial variable of interest is the CDS premium. Obviously, the CDS premiums should be driven by the credit risk of the underlying entity; the higher the credit risk, the higher the CDS premium should be. This credit risk reflected in the premiums has been subject to recent investigation in finance literature.
5 Figure 1 plots the CDS bid-ask midpoints as a function of credit quality. As can be seen from the figure, the dataset is in line with the theoretical hypothesis that the higher the risk of default, the higher the insurance fee.
Moreover, for each subset of the credit ratings, seniority, maturity, region, currency, and notional amount, the average midpoints of the bid-ask quotes for the CDS premiums were calculated. Table 1 shows the 5-year CDS premium midpoints with respect to several subsets. Note that sovereign CDSs are all denominated in USD, even for the European countries.
Interestingly, the EUR-denominated CDSs have lower average midpoints of bid-ask quotes than their USD counterparts. This result holds even when looking at the premiums within different rating classes, with the exception of Ba (Table 2) . A first attempt to explain this phenomenon (which is also present in other datasets; see might come from looking at the different specifications of deliverable bonds in case of restructuring. The smaller the set of deliverable bonds, the lower the value of the 'cheapestto-deliver option', which reflects the extra premium for the buyer of CDS for the privilege of being able to deliver any bond from a basket of available deliverable obligations. Recent literature has realized the reflection of this contractual term into prices, which ought to be different in European and North American markets. Unfortunately, this argument contradicts the observations gleaned from the dataset. Since the deliverable bonds are limited for USD-denominated CDSs, which leads to lower delivery option values, the CDS premiums should be lower. In future research efforts, a more detailed study on the differences between regional features should provide insight on this issue.
The Microstructure of Credit Default Swap Trading Venues
The Emerging Role of Interdealer Brokerage
Credit derivatives are not traded on exchanges but rather on the over-the-counter (OTC) market, where interdealer trades are accomplished via the use of different matching technologies. Like other OTC derivatives, the most common type of trade is transacted directly between two dealers over the telephone. This method is costly and time consuming because the dealer has to search for a matching counterparty. Compared to on-exchange derivatives markets, this kind of OTC market is opaque, non-anonymous, and highly fragmented. In recent years, increasingly more trades have been conducted through interdealer brokers (IDBs), who match buy-and sellside dealers while offering some additional services beyond the pure matching function. The ISDA's Operations Benchmarking Survey (2004) indicates that 34 per cent of the credit derivatives trades are arranged by brokers. This market share suggests that their services must provide some value to the dealers.
In other markets, most of the interdealer brokerage firms operate either on a fully automated electronic trading system or a voice-based system. Although voice brokers keep track of the quotes electronically, the dealers must still contact a broker over the telephone to place an order or to have a trade executed. In this setting, the interaction between the dealer and the broker may provide information that may increase the speed and probability of matching customer orders. For instance, the broker may try to surmise if there is more size behind the order than revealed and learn more about a dealer's trading incentives and true preferences. Meanwhile, the dealer can leave order contingencies with the broker. Conditioning trades on a broader set of information will improve the probability of order execution. Obviously, the network of dealers who are willing to offer liquidity is one of the most important assets of an IDB. This hidden supply of liquidity is sought by the broker in order to complete a client's trade. Both electronic and voice brokers preserve the anonymity of the dealer. However, by using a voice broker, the dealer may opt to dispense with anonymity. This option has value depending on market conditions and the dealer's motivation for trading.
From these discussions, it should be clear that voice brokers have a higher added value than electronic brokers and hence charge higher commissions in practice. Barclay et al. (2006) mention that for the US government bond IDB market, a voice broker's charge is roughly double the commission levied by electronic brokers. This is an explicit trading cost for the customer, who has to weigh this cost against the implicit cost incurred by any delay in trade execution. While the first type of cost is known before the trade, the second type is only ascertainable after a trade has been accomplished.
The Dual Approach to CDS Trading
During the early years, the CDS brokerage market was only voice based; the market conditions were not ready for automation. As the market became more liquid, CreditTrade Figure 1 Average bid-ask midpoints (bps) vs. credit quality (Moody's ratings) and other major IDBs adapted a different, innovative strategy from IDBs operating in the FX or Treasury markets. By integrating voice brokerage and electronic brokerage under one roof, CreditTrade and others could cope with potential competition from fully automated trading systems. In so doing, they succeeded in internalizing the competition and gained revenues from both matching technologies. These IDBs recognized at an early stage of the market's development that the fully automated trading of CDSs would not be achievable in the near future. By complementing voice brokerage, they could not only offer valuable intermediation services when necessary, but also enhance their efficiency and reach economies of scale. This market structure somewhat resembles an electronic trading system with an integrated upstairs market 6 run by the IDBs. In CreditTrade's market model, the electronic system offers a platform where dealers can enter quotes or hit existing quotes directly. This is a hit-and-take system where trades are triggered by dealers without using the voice broker. The firm's revenue is based on commissions per trade and a membership fee is not charged. CreditTrade charges a slightly lower commission for interdealer trades accomplished via its electronic platform compared to those executed by the voice brokers, which gives voice brokers no incentive to discourage customers from using the electronic platform. Commission schedules are defined in terms of basis points that increase with CDS premiums. The actual commission is computed as the product of the notional, maturity, and basis points (with reference to the strike interval of the premium), and is charged to both sides of the trade. Each client has a different decreasing scheme of basis points with increasing volume, which encourages more transactions. After a trade is executed, the details of the trade are processed, and a trade confirmation is sent to the buyers/sellers notifying them of their counterparty. Then the sides initiate their own post-trade processing, which is normally conducted by the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC).
This dual approach to CDS trading offers the dealers a choice between two trading venues that differ with respect to trading costs, level of trade execution services, and market transparency. Unfortunately, electronic brokerage data from CreditTrade that could be used for analyzing the determinants of a dealer's choice of trading venue is not available. Nevertheless, recent literature allows us to derive a view of the market. As discussed before, the higher commissions charged for voice broking are due to the services supplied beyond the pure transactional service provided by the electronic trading system. The extent to which voice broking is used will vary depending on trade size, trade complexity, market conditions, and CDS features, such as currency. While the larger and more complex trades may be left with the voice broker, the electronic system can be used for simpler and smaller-sized transactions in the most widely traded CDS currencies, USD and EUR. However, if the volatility of the underlying market increases or the CDS market is exposed to asymmetric information, then dealers will be less willing to have their orders revealed on electronic quotation and will prefer trading via the voice broker. Under these market conditions the IDBs can offer greater liquidity because their market provides access to a wide range of institutions that supply liquidity. The two trading venues also offer a choice between different degrees of market transparency. For instance, traders with private information may prefer the voice brokerage system with less transparency. Uninformed traders also stand to benefit by dealing through the voice brokers under conditions of asymmetric information; the IDB is able to certify them as uninformed, which results in trades at better prices. The next section presents a discussion on the effects of increased automation and transparency through electronic platforms.
Electronic Trading and Transparency in the CDS Market
The outlook on the CDS market is towards automation of the full trade process. Using Web-based technology, IDBs offer screen-based transaction services to facilitate the execution of trades and to disseminate pre-trade information via electronic platforms. However, none of the systems provides a forum for automated trade execution. Compared to similar interdealer markets, like the FX market and the US Treasury bond market, which also rely on voice and electronic IDBs, the OTC market for credit derivatives has reached a relatively low level of automation for trade processes. Apart from trade execution, the ISDA 2004 Survey reports significant improvements in the automation of key functions for trading credit derivatives. For example, the auto-matching of trades as a method of trade confirmation was used for the very first time in 2004 and managed to corral four per cent of all trades. Nevertheless, the survey reveals that there are still potential gains to be had from automation with respect to improving the operational efficiency of the front office, where many process frictions occur due to data problems (e.g. errors in trade data, missing and/or untimely data). The more recent ISDA 2006 Survey indicates that among other derivatives, the credit derivatives market will be subject to most plans to increase automation in all trade phases. The rapid growth of volume in the OTC derivatives market has led to an industry consensus on the need to achieve 'straight through processing' (STP), which means enabling the entire process from trade initiation to settlement to be conducted electronically. In January 2004, the ISDA issued a strategic plan calling for substantial industry automation of all OTC derivatives products by the end of 2006. Meanwhile, a number of firms offer valuable STP solutions to the industry for improving the operational efficiency of the OTC credit derivatives market. 7 Improved reference data management in particular represents a major step towards the achievement of STP.
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The research on electronic platforms generally considers transparency to be an important design feature of financial markets. The implementation of electronic platforms by interdealer brokers yields more transparent markets, in which (anonymous) quotes can be tracked. Nevertheless, it is still debated in the literature whether higher transparency will lead to fairer markets with better liquidity and price discovery. The evidence on transparency as summarized by O'Hara (1995) includes cases where increased transparency reduces adverse selection costs so that dealers can spot other traders who are more informed; this in turn reduces spreads. On the other hand, some studies put forward that opaque markets may help to improve liquidity (Bloomfield and O'Hara 2000) . Another argument is that the dealers in a quote-driven market would be less willing to reveal their strategies under increased transparency, which would also lead to lower liquidity (Madhavan et al. 2005) . In addition, the model proposed by Madhavan (1996) predicts that transparency can worsen price volatility. The tradeoff between accessing information and revealing identities is hard to separate. Therefore, institutional traders would be at an advantage if they were able to reach fairer prices through a transparent market while remaining anonymous (which is feasible in many electronic interdealer brokerage platforms). Although there are no empirical studies on electronic CDS markets, some studies analyze the effects of market transparency in related markets, e.g. the bond market. Bessembinder et al. (2006) have investigated the introduction of the TRACE 9 system and found that execution costs substantially decreased for bonds eligible for the electronic market.
Most of the evidence above is concerned with increased market transparency for the public. However, the market for CDSs is still a closed shop in which dealers are not willing to convey their quotes to outsiders. As in other markets, the vested interests of the dealers slow the train towards fully electronic trading, because trading profits will erode as markets become more centralized and more transparent. Hence, the discussion on market transparency is mostly restricted to this shop gaining deeper insight into the market. Undoubtedly, with the collection and distribution of quotes and prices, the market is becoming more transparent, although the gains are limited to a countable number of market participants. Obviously, one aim is to prevent outsiders who do not add value to the market from free riding on dealers' quotations. To promote further growth, closed shop trading should be reduced over time with an eye to opening the market to a wider public. Eroding profits should then be compensated for by the larger trading volume. An increase of market transparency and liquidity can be expected from the listing of exchange-traded credit derivative products based on the iTraxx Europe CDS index, which is intended by Eurex for the year 2006. 
Empirical Evidence on Trading and Liquidity of the CDS Market
Within the described brokerage setting, we analyze the liquidity in the CDS market in this section. In the first part, determinants of liquidity in the IDB market are the focal point. Later, a comparison of liquidity across alternative trading venues is presented.
Liquidity of the IDB Market
Liquidity is one of the key attributes of financial markets and refers to different dimensions, such as depth, tightness, resiliency, and immediacy. Measuring liquidity is a complex task for which various instruments have been proposed (see Schwartz and Francioni 2004, pp. 60-63) . These are based on transaction costs (e.g. bid-ask spread, market impact, total cost of trading), trading volume (e.g. turnover, number of shares, number of transactions), and volatility (e.g. price variance, resiliency, intraday mid-point returns). Most of the evidence in the literature on liquidity is provided for stock markets. There are also recent studies focusing on trading and liquidity in interdealer broker markets for government bonds using GovPX and CanPX data (Boni and Leach 2004; Huang et al. 2002; D'Souza et al. 2003) . However, relatively little is known about the liquidity of derivatives markets. The few available studies concentrate on the effect of illiquidity on prices of currency options (Brenner et al. 2001) or on interest rate options (Deuskar et al. 2006) . Concerning the CDS market, there are recent works claiming that the liquidity of CDSs is relatively high compared to corporate bonds, since CDSs are contracts but not securities.
11 To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to focus on the determinants of CDS liquidity.
Our analysis examines bid-ask quotes in the absence of trade data. 12 Microstructure theory explains the bid-ask spreads by means of three components accounting for the different costs that a dealer faces. Viewing the spreads as a measure for the cost of transacting dates back to the work of Demsetz (1968) . According to this early study, the quoted spread should be a fair compensation for dealers who offer immediacy by supplying resources to the market. Demsetz and others show that the spread depends on various proxies for trading activity, security risk, and competition. Secondly, the theoretical models of dealer markets put forward that spreads should increase with inventory holding costs (Ho and Stoll 1983; Biais 1993) . Lastly, information-based models of dealer markets imply an adverse selection part of the spread, which accounts for the risk of trading with informed investors (Bagehot 1971; Copeland and Galai 1983; Glosten and Milgrom 1985) . Easley et al. (1996) provide strong empirical evidence that the risk of trading with an informed investor explains a large part of the variation in spreads of NYSE traded stocks. In addition, Flood et al. (1999) argue that these three components of the quoted spread can be extended by an additional search cost component to account for the asymmetries of counterparty search.
In a competitive CDS market, the quoted spreads should be driven by economic forces that are implied by the theoretical models of market microstructure. The characteristics of CDS contracts can be used to proxy for the risks a CDS dealer faces and thus be reflected in the spread. For instance, the CDS's maturity, notional amount, and premium will drive inventory costs, because these features indicate how much risk will be carried in the inventory. Thus, in a panel regression, we regress the absolute bid-ask spreads on several contract features: The Moody's rating, rank, currency, notional amount, restructuring, 13 and maturity have been selected as explanatory variables. Intuitively, credit risk proxied by ratings should be a determinant of absolute spreads. In an empirical investigation by Odders-White and Ready (2006) for the stock market, it is shown that poorer debt ratings are related to higher spreads due to both higher adverse selection and trading costs. On the other hand, Acharya and Johnson's study (2007) , one of the few empirical studies to address CDSs, finds no evidence that adverse selection affects prices or liquidity in the CDS market. Even then the argument of higher trading costs remains, so we expect the spread to widen as the credit quality indicated by ratings declines. Subordinated CDSs are also anticipated to be less liquid than senior CDS and carry a higher absolute bid-ask spread. In addition, a higher notional amount translates into a higher inventory cost and thus could also result in a higher bid-ask spread. There is no prior expectation for the liquidity differences regarding the currency and restructuring clauses of the contracts.
After extracting the data points with no rating or maturity information as well as sovereign entities, 169,009 data points remain within the period of January 2001 to January 2005. For the whole sample the average bid-ask spread is 22 bid-ask midpoints (bps), with a standard deviation of 68 bps. The absolute spread could be as high as 2000 bps, as CDSs were written on Enron just before its default in 2001. The average bid-ask spread for the rating class Aaa is 9 bps, which increases to 543 bps for the Caa class.
The results of the panel regression, in which the absolute bid-ask spread is regressed on several independent variables, are reported in column (1) of Table 3 . A low percentage of variation is explained (14.52 per cent) and a highly significant intercept is present, indicating that there are missing variables. Unfortunately, there is no volume data available from the IDB market, which would be helpful for understanding liquidity. Nevertheless, all explanatory variables are highly significant. Not surprisingly, the numerical value for the Moody's rating is the variable that contributes most to the explanatory power of the regression, explaining 7.15 per cent of variation. One notch of deterioration with respect to the rating increases the bid-ask spread by 3.98 bps on average. Currency and restructuring are other highly contributing variables. A move from EUR to USD increases the bid-ask spread by 20.72 bps. It is possible that currency may proxy for other undefined variables, such as settlement differences or the varying degrees of openness in the different CDS market segments. In keeping with the expectations, the significant and positive parameter estimate for the notional amount indicates a move from five million notional to 10 million notional contracts, causing the bid-ask spread to increase by 12.99 bps. This coincides with an increasing inventory-holding cost component with higher notional amounts. A closer analysis of the dataset reveals that this finding is also related to a timing issue. The first two years in the dataset were dominated by 10 million notional contracts, and during this time 13 The restructuring dummy has a value of '0' for the Old Restructuring (OR) clause where minimum restrictions on delivery option are present; '1' for Modified Modified Restructuring (MMR), the valid clause for Europe after June 2003, which constrains the old clause; and '2' for Modified Restructuring (MR), the valid clause for North American entities. The latter is the most restrictive clause overall and reduces the value of the delivery option. the premiums were high. In the last two years, the average premium declined, as our set was dominated by five million notional contracts, and the CDS market was more liquid than during the first two years.
14 In order to investigate this timing issue, year dummies have been introduced to the regression (column (2)). It is observed that the absolute spread Regression equation for (1): (IDB BAS ) = β 0 + β 1 (Rank) + β 2 (Maturity) + β 3 (Currency) + β 4 (Restructuring) + β 5 (Rating) + β 6 (Amount) + ɛ Dependent variable: IDB BAS is the CreditTrade daily closing CDS absolute bid-ask spread.
Explanatory variables: Rank dummy, "0" for Senior, "1" for Subordinated contracts; Maturity, one of the values of "12", "36", "60", "84", or "120", in months; Currency dummy, "0" for EUR, "1" for USD denominated contracts; Restructuring, having a value of "0" for Old Restructuring (OR) clause; "1" for Modified Modified Restructuring (MMR); and "2" for Modified Restructuring (MR); Rating, a value between 1 and 16, "1" corresponding to "Aaa", and "16" to "B3", assigned by Moody's; Amount dummy, "0" for 5 million, in the first two years (indicated by year dummies 1 and 2) are about 19bps points higher than the base year, 2004. For further analysis, separate regressions for each rating group have been undertaken. From columns (3) to (8), it can be seen that rank, currency, and restructuring estimates are consistent across rating classes. While subordinate absolute spreads are higher than that of senior CDSs, a move from EUR to USD causes the spreads to widen, except for class B (column (8)). Similarly, the restructuring variable coefficient is always negative; indicating that restricting the deliverable obligations decreases the spreads. Finally, although the percentage of variation explained seems to increase for low rating classes, this is not monotonous. Nevertheless, the regressions on non-investment grade CDS spreads (Ba and B) have a better R 2 than investment grade CDS spreads, on average. 
Differences of Liquidity across Trading Venues
It is well documented in the literature that market structure impacts liquidity and trading costs (Stoll 2000) . In particular, bid-ask spreads may differ in terms of size and composition with respect to the alternative trading venues available in the CDS market. The early work of Garbade (1978) suggests that joining an IDB reduces search costs, resulting in lower trading costs. More recently Reiss and Werner (2005) pointed out that interdealer trades have two important motives, the risk sharing of dealers and information asymmetries (Ho and Stoll 1983; Reiss and Werner 1998) . In their empirical investigation, they contrast interdealer trading on the London Stock Exchange by using stock prices from the nonintermediated OTC market and brokered trading systems. They find that differences in liquidity across trading systems on the LSE are mainly driven by problems of adverse selection. On the other hand, Acharya and Johnson (2007) provide empirical evidence that adverse selection does not affect liquidity in the CDS market. However, their study is based on CDS benchmark products traded via an IDB. Hence, it is an open question whether this result transfers to the direct OTC market. Assume that IDB and direct OTC CDS markets are well integrated due to the informational linkage. Then the asymmetric information component is the same in both venues. Assume moreover that inventory costs are similar across venues by virtue of their tendency to attract the same participants. According to Garbade's reasoning, this leaves only the trading cost differences between IDBs and the direct OTC market. An important extension to Garbade's argument should incorporate the additional services provided by IDBs. Although search costs decrease by joining an IDB, if brokers offer additional services, the trading cost component in bid-ask spreads should also reflect the premium for the added value of the brokerage function. Consider both search costs and the added value of the brokerage function: If the latter were to dominate, it would lead to IDB spreads being higher than the non-intermediated OTC market spreads, which forms our first hypothesis:
H1: The quoted absolute bid-ask spread in the IDB market is higher than in the direct, non-intermediated OTC market.
In order to analyze the spread differences in these markets, the monthly data of direct OTC quotes were retrieved from Bloomberg in addition to the quotes of CreditTrade presented in Section 1.2. The direct OTC dataset includes 12 mid-month observations for more than 200 entities for the year 2004. 16 In order to match the bid and ask quotes for a given entity on a day with the IDB data, we took the direct OTC quotes of multiple dealers to reach a closing inside spread for each day. This resulting dataset had 1,883 matching observations. Around ninety per cent of the entities had 5-year contracts, whereas the remaining entities were written on 1-, 3-, 7-, and 10-year maturity contracts. All quotes belong to senior CDSs.
For testing the first hypothesis, Table 4 presents a significance test for the differences between the absolute bid-ask spreads of the two markets. In keeping with hypothesis H1, the difference of bid-ask spreads is highly significant, with the IDB spread being higher than the OTC spread. This suggests that the IDB spreads include a larger transaction cost component. Apparently, this conclusion rests on the idea that the information and inventory components in spreads are the same across the two venues. The asymmetric information and inventory holding costs affect both markets similarly if the markets are integrated and reflect the same information. This hypothesis of market integration can be tested by analyzing the percentage of non-overlapping bid-ask spreads and by also comparing the midpoints of the quotes. If both trading markets are integrated in prices, then we can indeed conclude that the extra spread consists of only the trading costs incurred by the dealers who select the IDBs.
H2: Prices across IDB and direct OTC venues are the same, indicating well-integrated markets. Table 5 presents whether the direct OTC and IDB quotes are nested, overlapping, or non-intersecting. Seven possible alternatives for the bid-ask spreads are tabulated. The first three cases indicate when spreads are nested or equal. The fourth and fifth are overlapping, with higher quotes given in one market. The last two cases are the non-intersecting spreads, where an arbitrage possibility is present. As expected, most cases fall into the first five types. 9.02 per cent of the quotes denote arbitrage possibilities; a bid quote in one market being higher than the ask quote in the other market. However, it is worth noting that we are comparing the indicative IDB quotes with inside direct OTC closing quotes. It therefore stands to reason that these may not indicate actual arbitrage possibilities. Overall, these results suggest that the markets are integrated.
Additional support for the integrated structure of both markets is presented by directly comparing the midpoints for the same dataset. Table 6 presents the pricing differences of 1,883 pairs, which are taken to be the difference of direct OTC and IDB midpoints. It indicates that the prices are not significantly different. In summary, results of these two tables support the second hypothesis, which states that pricing is consistent across trading venues for the selected list of companies. This finding can be attributed to two reasons: Firstly, CDS trading mainly occurs between major institutions with good ratings, which suggests that dealer base overlaps are present. Second, the datasets used for the analysis are from a selection of major companies that have liquid contracts, denominated in EUR or USD. This result indicates that the information and inventory cost components of the two venues are the same. It also confirms the results obtained by Acharya and Johnson (2007) , who do not find evidence of adverse selection with a similar dataset.
Given that the markets are well integrated, one question remains to be addressed: What causes the differences in trading costs, or in other words, under which conditions are the additional services of a brokerage of value? Intuitively, it could be expected that illiquid, riskier CDS trades are conveyed to IDBs. This hypothesis would be in line with Barclay et al.'s (2006) findings in the US Treasury bond market. Their results distinguish between on-the-run US Treasury securities that are traded by electronic IDBs with a market share of 80 per cent and off-the-run securities where voice broking is highly preferred (88 per cent). This is mostly because the intermediaries' extra effort is necessary for illiquid, complex, and larger-sized trades. The intermediaries' ability to match complex trades is sometimes referred to as 'market color'. Although the authors compare the automated and intermediated brokerage platforms, their results are relevant in that they indicate the necessity of intermediation in case of illiquidity. Hence, in the following, we analyze whether the spreads of the two markets are affected by the need of intermediation in cases of more complex trades. In the CDS market, a direct measure of trade complexity is the credit quality of the underlying since the CDS premiums are an indication of credit risk. We would expect the deterioration of credit quality to widen the absolute bid-ask spreads, as well as the difference between IDB and direct OTC spreads. The first part of the argument was shown in the last section, while the second part forms the hypothesis below: H3: The difference between the IDB and the direct OTC absolute spreads widens with decreasing credit quality.
To test this hypothesis, we regress the difference between absolute spreads on the midpoint of the direct OTC quotes. 17 The results in Table 7 indeed indicate a high significance of credit quality, which means that the higher the midpoint, the higher the spread difference between the IDB and the direct OTC market. This suggests that riskier and more complex trades are conveyed to the IDBs, and can be interpreted as that the dealers value the additional transaction services beyond pure trade execution. Nevertheless, the percentage of variance explained is low, indicating missing variables. Obviously, one of these can be competitiveness differences between the quotes posted in two venues. IDB quotes can be less competitive than the direct OTC quotes, which actually can be varying for different credit qualities. In fact, our results might indicate that the more competitive direct OTC market may attract the high credit quality CDS, leaving the IDBs the less liquid and less competitive quotes. Unfortunately, we cannot construct a variable to proxy for this factor. Being still in its development stages, the CDS market does not provide volume data, which would be a natural candidate for proxying competitiveness. Similarly, the depth of quotes may be an important factor behind the liquidity differences. The presence of depth information would lead to an improved understanding of the overall picture concerning the liquidity in these two markets.
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Conclusions and Outlook
This paper provides new insight into the trading of credit default swaps, one of the most successful OTC derivatives to emerge in recent times. In the first part, the advantages of the centralized, anonymous brokerage market in comparison to the fragmented, opaque direct OTC market are discussed. While highlighting the role of voice brokerage, we describe how intermediation is still a viable business in a market that is in transition to automation. The examination of the numerous features of CDS contracts show that frictions in the 17 Significance is also reached when IDB midpoints are used as the explanatory variable. product market are nearly resolved by means of standardization, which is a necessary step towards automation. However, although most of the automation efforts focus on data management issues, the automation of trade execution has not yet been realized. This is mostly because the OTC derivatives market entails phone conversations involving the dealers themselves or conducted via brokers. To keep up with the pace of change, some voice brokers in the industry have adapted to industry expectations by complementing their services with an electronic platform. CreditTrade has opted to follow this road and promotes market quality in terms of market transparency and liquidity. In situations where the demand for liquidity is extreme, these IDBs are probably the most important suppliers of liquidity in that they encourage large institutions to post their quotes in high volume. For this to happen, the electronic platform must be inexpensive to use and must provide services desired by the traders. The first condition is met by using Web-based technologies that offer market entry at virtually no cost and make it easy to switch between trading platforms, while the second condition is met by lower trading costs and ensuring market anonymity.
In the last part, we provide empirical evidence concerning the liquidity of intermediated versus non-intermediated markets and the variation of liquidity across CDS contract features. Liquidity is a special issue in the CDS market, since the instruments are not securities in fixed supply. We note that the quoted bid-ask spread should account for adverse selection and inventory holding costs, as well as the costs of any transactional service, including search costs. Our results show no significant difference in pricing across trading venues, indicating a well-integrated CDS market. Apparently, the overlapping of the set of dealers committed to both trading platforms might be a reason for this outcome. Despite the fact that the CDS market has a countable number of dealers and brokerage firms, our study indicates that quotes are not purely driven by market power but vary due to certain underlying economic forces. The quoted spread is higher in the intermediated market, which has been suggested to stand for the added value of the brokerage function. It is noteworthy to mention that this is only one of the possible explanations for spread differences. Certainly, many factors come into picture considering trade volumes, depths, trade complexities and credit qualities.
These results provide evidence for showing that brokerage has an effective place in the CDS market despite the higher costs of liquidity. The value of intermediation will exist as long as complex trades need special handling and explain why voice brokerage still has an important share in many markets in spite of increasing competition from electronic trading systems. If electronic trading systems manage to capture a critical market share that hurts the voice brokerage business, then the voice broker will have to adapt by creating new value-added services. How future CDS markets will be shaped remains an open issue; meanwhile, our study has been a first step in illuminating a formerly opaque market during its period of transition.
